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DE FACTO TAKING AND
MUNICIPAL CLEARANCE PROJECTS:
CITY PLAN OR CITY SCHEME?
In Amen v. City of Dearborn' plaintiff property owners in two sec-
tions of Dearborn, Michigan, brought a class action suit alleging that
certain activities of defendant-City constituted a taking of plaintiffs'
property without due process of law.2 The challenged activities involved
the clearance of a residential area for future industrial use. A federal
district court found that the City's tactics constituted a taking of
property for which plaintiffs were entitled to just compensation.3 In
addition, the court found that plaintiffs were entitled to injunctive
relief because the City failed to show a valid public purpose for the
project.4
Governmental units may acquire private property for public use
either by condemnation under the power of eminent domain or by out-
right purchase from the owner.s In some situations, however, a govern-
ment planning to redevelop an area may delay directly and openly
taking such property even though it eventually intends to do so.6 Ab-
sent a de jure taking involving formal condemnation proceedings, all
1. 363 F. Supp. 1267 (E.D. Mich. 1973).
2. Id. at 1269.
3. Id. at 1278. The court held:
Although none of the activities of the City standing alone may have consti-
tuted a taking of plaintiffs' property, this court finds that the combination
of the City's announcement and attendant publicity of the clearance projects,
the City's refusal to issue certain repair and building permits coupled with
its efforts to discourage repairs, the lack of care of City-owned property, the
posting of signs on vacant buildings which invited vandalism, the posting of
large signs in the area offering to buy property, the solicitation of sales to
the City, the City's lack of initiative to control pollution in the South End,
and the gradual acquisition of properties in both areas resulted in the taking
of property in these areas for which homeowners are entitled to just compen-
sation.
Id. at 1277-78.
4. Id. at 1279, 1283-84.
5. 2 P. NICHOLS, THE LAw OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.1[1] (rev. 3d ed. 1974)
[hereinafter cited as NIcHoLs].
6. See, e.g., Foster v. City of Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Mich. 1966),
aff'd, 405 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1968); Drakes Bay Land Co. v. United States,
424 F.2d 574 (Ct. Cl. 1970); Gordon v. City of Warren Planning & Urban
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courts will recognize a de facto taking in the classic situation "involv-
ing a direct invasion of the condemnee's property or a direct legal re-
straint on its use."7 Adhering to the spirit of constitutional restraints8
courts have used four basic "theories" to decide whether a constitu-
tional taking requiring compensation has occurred:9 physical invasion,' 0
Renewal Comm'n, 388 Mich. 82, 199 N.W.2d 465 (1972); In re Urban Renewal,
Elmwood Park Project (City of Detroit v. Cassese), 376 Mich. 311, 136 N.W.2d
896 (1965); City of Buffalo v. J.W. Clement Co., 28 N.Y.2d 241, 269 N.E.2d
895, 321 N.Y.S.2d 345 (1971); Empire Constr., Inc. v. City of Tulsa, 512 P.2d
119 (Okla.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1094 (1973).
7. City of Buffalo v. J.W. Clement Co., 28 N.Y.2d 241, 253, 269 N.E.2d
895, 902, 321 N.Y.S.2d 345, 356 (1971).
8. The fifth amendment guarantees that "nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. Similarly,
the fourteenth amendment guarantees that "nor shall any state deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law," U.S. CoNsT.
amend. XIV, § 2, and applies the fifth amendment to state governments and
their agencies. See Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226
(1897); City of Cincinnati v. Vester, 33 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1929), aff'd, 281
U.S. 439 (1930). See also Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
9. See Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REy. 1165, 1183-1201
(1967) [hereinafter cited as Michelman]; Sax, Takings and the Police Power,
74 YALE L.J. 36, 46-60 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Sax]. See also CoUNcIL
ON ENVIRONMENTAL QuALrry, FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT 125-50 (1973); Com-
ment, A Redefinition of Just Compensation for Takings in Urban Redevelopment,
6 WAKE FOREST INTRA. L. REV. 84, 91 n_38 (1969).
10. The physical invasion theory turns on a determination "whether or not
the public or its agents have physically used or occupied something belonging
to the claimant." Michelman, supra note 9, at 1184; see id. 1184-90; Sax, supra
note 9, at 46-48. See also 4 NICHOLS, supra note 5, at § 12.3151[5]. "Ordinarily,
a de facto taking requires a physical entry by the condemnor, a physical ouster
of the owner, a legal interference with the physical use, possession or enjoyment
of the property, or a legal interference with the owner's power of disposition of
the property." Id. at 58 (Supp. 1974). The exceptions to this general rule have
become so numerous that Professor Sax has suggested that the "formal appro-
priation or physical invasion theory should be rejected once and for all." Sax,
supra note 9, at 48.
For examples of cases employing the physical invasion theory to require com-
pensation see Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962) (low-flying aircraft
constituted a compensable taking of an air easement); United States v. Pewec
Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 (1951) (property seized by federal government during
wartime); United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799 (1950)
(government dam raised the water table of land rendering it useless); United
States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (low-flying aircraft); Richards v. Wash-
ington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1914) (smoke driven across land by exhaust
fan); United States v. Welch, 217 U.S. 333 (1910) (destruction of private
road); Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871) (backing
up of water flow over plaintiff's land); Eyherabide v. United States, 345 F.2d
[Vol. 9:317
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol9/iss1/16
DE FACTO TAKING
nuisance abatement,1 diminution of value,'12 and balancing of in-
terests"3
The Amen decision rests primarily on the diminution of value and
balancing of interests theories. A dual approach is possible because
565 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (plaintiff's land shelled by artillery when mistaken for part
of naval gunnery range).
The restriction of compensable takings to actual physical occupation can lead
to an inequitable result if it is the only criterion considered. As long as the
government refrains from an actual conversion of the property to a public use,
it can claim that the property has not been "taken" in the narrowest sense of
the word:
It would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result, if in construing a pro-
vision of constitutional law, always understood to have been adopted for
protection and security to the rights of the individual as against the govern-
ment . . . , it shall be held that if the government refrains from the absolute
conversion of real property to the uses of the public it can destroy its value
entirely, can inflict irreparable and permanent injury to any extent, can, in
effect, subject it to total destruction without making any compensation, be-
cause, in the narrowest sense of the word, it is not taken for the public use.
Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 177-78 (1871).
The seeming disparity in the airplane overflight cases illustrates the possibility
of an inequitable application of the physical invasion theory. Compare United
States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (low-flying government aircraft-com-
pensation required under the physical invasion and diminution of value theories),
with Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 955 (1963) (noise, smoke, and vibration from aircraft in the absence of
overhead flight does not require compensation under either theory). The Batten
court seems to have based its decision on the premise that physical trespass
defines the taking. One commentator has pointed out the irony that results
when a court will compensate for sound waves emanating from a "vertical" but not
from a "lateral" source. Russell, Recent Developments in Inverse Condemnation of
Airspace, 39 J. AIR L. & CoM. 81, 83 (1973). See also Gandal, Governmental
Liability for Nonphysical Damage to Land, 2 URBAN LAW. 315, 319-23 (1970).
11. The nuisance abatement theory rests on the governmental police power
and applies a noxious use test. The uses that can be destroyed without compen-
sation are those that are in some sense wrongful or harmful. See Sax, supra note
9, at 48. Judicial consideration focuses on "whether the claimant has sustained
any loss apart from the restriction of his liberty to conduct some activity con-
sidered harmful to other people." Michelman, supra note 9, at 1184; see id.
1196-1201; Sax, supra note 9, at 48-50. When private property is used in a
manner harmful to the public, compensation is not required if the government
acts to protect the public from the nuisance-like action. This is true regardless of
whether the owner is to blame for the harm caused by the use of his property and
regardless of whether the regulation effectively destroys the entire value of the
property. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962)
(ordinance prohibiting excavation below the water table upheld); Mugler v.
Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (law prohibiting manufacture of intoxicating
liquors upheld). In both cases the regulations were held to be valid exercises
of the police power.
12. See notes 16-18, 39 and accompanying text infra.
13. See text at notes 41-43 infra.
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standard judicial consideration of the taking issue relies on "no set
formula."1 4 In fact, it may be said that whether a taking has occurred
must be decided on a case-by-case basis.15 Consequently, the particu-
lar facts of the Dearborn project were crucial to the court's decision.
Application of the diminution of value theory is difficult. The
criterion for evaluation is "the size of the harm sustained by the
claimant or the degree to which his affected property has been de-
valued" by governmental action. 6 Generally, a taking will be found
under this theory only when the government has caused a significant
decline in the value of private property.'7 Difficulty arises from the
impossibility of devising a rigid test to determine how much economic
harm must occur before a taking is found. s The issue is further
14. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962). See also
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
15. See 2 NICHOLS, supra note 5, at § 6.1[1]:
J]ust how severe the interference with the owner's enjoyment of his property
must be to constitute a taking... is not a question which can be answered in
such a way as to furnish a concise rule readily applicable to all cases likely
to arise. Each case must be decided on its own merits until, by the gradual
process of judicial exclusion and inclusion, it is possible to say on which side
of the line any given injury to private property rights may be said to fall.
Id. at 6-14 to -15.
16. Michelman, supra note 9, at 1184; see id. 1190-93; Sax, supra note 9,
at 50-60.
17. The landmark case decided under the diminution of value theory is
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), in which, under a
statute forbidding mining below homes, a compensable taking was found because
the statute acted to the detriment of a mining company that had reserved such
rights in its sale of the surface land to homeowners. The Court stated: "The
general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain
extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." Id. at 415;
see Drakes Bay Land Co. v. United States, 424 F.2d 574 (Ct. Cl. 1970), in
which a taking was found when the government delayed so long in the planned
condemnation of plaintiff's land that it effectively destroyed its market value
through the threat of imminent condemnation. But see Empire Constr., Inc. v.
City of Tulsa, 512 P.2d 119 (Okla. 1973) (destruction of market value through
delay not compensable).
The soundness of the diminution of value theory has been called into question
by both practitioners and academicians. See, e.g., F. BOSSEL, AN, D. CALLIES
& J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE 124-38 (1973); Sax, supra note 9, at 50-60.
18. See Sax, supra note 9, at 50:
Essentially the [diminution of value] theory appears to express two inter-
related ideas: (1) that all legally acquired existing economic values are
property, and (2) that while such values may be diminished somewhat
without compensation, they may not be excessively diminished; the meaning
of "excessive" is necessarily imprecise, but it is fairly clear under the theory
that it would be unconstitutional to deprive a property of all or substantially
all its economic value.
[Vol. 9:317
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complicated in municipal clearance project cases by the confusion
that exists between de facto taking and the closely related phenomenon
of "precondemnation blight."1 9
The factor that distinguishes Amen from precondemnation blight
cases and most de facto taking cases is that the City never intended
to condemn the residential properties in the areas it chose to clear
for commercial and industrial use.20 The court concluded that the
City clearance plan had become a City scheme consisting of a com-
bination of governmental activities designed to force the residents
19. See, e.g., City of Buffalo v. J.W. Clement Co., 28 N.Y.2d 241, 269
N.E.2d 895, 321 N.Y.S.2d 345 (1971):
"[Clondemnation blight" relates to the impact of certain acts upon the value
of the subject property. It in no way imports a taking in the constitutional
sense, but merely permits a more realistic valuation of the condemned property
in the subsequent de jure proceeding. In such a case, compensation shall
be based on the value of the property at the time of taking, as if it had not
been subjected to the debilitating effect of a threatened condemnation.
Id. at 255, 269 N.E.2d at 903, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 357. The court declined to
find that a de facto taking had occurred, yet allowed increased compensation for
condemnation blight. See 1973 URBAN L. ANN. 343: "An award for condem-
nation blight compensates a property owner for the devaluation caused by the
condemning authority's "affirmative value-depressing acts" such as a threat of con-
demnation .... The governmental prerogative of eminent domain can preclude pri-
vate use of land, rendering it virtually valueless at market." Id. at 345. See also
4 Nscsois, supra note 5, at § 12.3151[5]: "A great deal of the confusion which
exists has arisen by reason of the fact that 'condemnation blight' has been equated
with de facto taking, but it has been held that all that results from condemnation
blight is an impact upon value which should be disregarded regardless of whether
the impact is appreciative or depreciative in character. . . ." Id. at 58 (Supp.
1974); see note 72 infra.
Despite the distinction drawn by the New York Court of Appeals in ].W.
Clement Co., the idea that a de facto taking exists in the absence of a physical
invasion or direct legal restraint is not without current support and finds some
viability in the pronouncements of other courts. See, e.g., Madison Realty Co.
v. City of Detroit, 315 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Mich. 1970); Foster v. City of
Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Mich. 1966), afl'd, 405 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1968);
In re Urban Renewal, Elmwood Park Project (City of Detroit v. Cassese), 376
Mich. 311, 136 N.W.2d 896 (1965); City of Cleveland v. Carcione, 118 Ohio
App. 525, 190 N.E.2d 52 (1963).
20. 363 F. Supp. at 1272. In Eyherabide v. United States, 345 F.2d 565
(Ct. Cl. 1965), the court stated that "although there may be no official inten-
tion to acquire any property interest, certain governmental actions entail such
an actual invasion of private property rights that a constitutional taking must
be implied." Id. at 567: accord, Madison Realty Co. v. City of Detroit, 315
F. Supp. 367, 371 (E.D. Mich. 1970) ("Initiation of eminent domain pro-
ceedings is not a requisite to a finding that a 'taking' has in fact occurred
allowing for recovery by a property owner").
1975]
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to sell to the City.21 If the City had taken plaintiffs' properties
through its power of eminent domain, it would have had to provide
an opportunity for hearings on the prices it was to pay.22 The City
chose instead to acquire the property by forcing the owners to sell
directly to the City. As the court explained: "The term 'taking'
implies the acquisition of property by the government without re-
gard to the wishes of the owner. A taking can be accomplished
by use of governmental powers of eminent domain or it can be
accomplished by other kinds of governmental action."23 The court
found such "other kinds of governmental action" in this case: the
City was not paying a fair price for the property it acquired, the
City actually contributed to the decline of property values in the
area, and certain actions by the City seemed specifically designed
to make the area undesirable for residential use.24 The combined
result was a diminution in value that constituted a taking of these
properties.
In addition to using verbal coercion 2 the City enhanced its bar-
gaining position by changing the formula used to determine the price
it would offer. The determination, now based upon comparable sales
in the area, the assessed value, and the price originally paid by the
owner for the property,6 dearly operated to the detriment of the
21. 363 F. Supp. at 1272. The court listed twenty separate activities that
it found "forced" sales to the city. Id. at 1272-74; cf. Post-Trial Brief for
Defendant City at 15-34, Amen v. City of Dearborn, 363 F. Supp. 1267 (E.D.
Mich. 1973). For a discussion of "bad faith" on the part of a condemning
authority see Note, The Condemnor's Liability for Damages Arising Through
Instituting, Litigating, or Abandoning Eminent Domain Proceedings, 1967 UTAH
L. REv. 548, 552.
22. 363 F. Supp. at 1281. The Supreme Court has held: "It is essential to
due process that the mode of determining the compensation be such as to afford
the owner an opportunity to be heard." Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U.S. 57, 59
(1919). See generally Roswig, Some Current Issues in Eminent Domain, 40
N.Y. ST. B.J. 44 (1968).
23. 363 F. Supp. at 1276.
24. Id. at 1272, 1277-78.
25. The City Director of the Community Development Department told
people in the area that the prices paid by the City for their properties would
be going down and that their homes had a fixed maximum price. Id. at 1272.
As one commentator has noted: "It would be manifestly unjust to permit a
public authority to depreciate property values by a threat . . . and then to
take advantage of this depression in the price which it must pay for the prop-
erty." 1 L. ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOMsAIrN 447 (2d ed. 1953).
26. 363 F. Supp. at 1274. From 1965 to 1969 the City's offering price was
based on the property's assessed value, the price of comparable homes in the
[Vol. 9:317
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homeowner since each of the three factors contained latent value-
diminishing aspects. First, the comparable sales in the area brought
lower prices as the City continued to publicize the clearance project.27
Secondly, the percentage ratio of the assessed value to the actual cash
value of homes in the clearance area was purposely reduced by the
City to depress values further.28 Lastly, since many people in the
area had owned their homes for more than ten years, the original
price did not reflect present value. The original purchase price
ignored the rise in market value due to inflation and physical im-
provements. 9 The prices offered by the City were frequently as
much as $5,000 less than what the owner originally asked. 30
The court also concluded that the effect of the City's actions was
"to depress the value of the property for the immediate future."3'
area and other sections of the city, and the condition of the house. This formula,
if applied in the absence of coercive pressure, would have been a reasonable
test for determining fair market value. In 1968, however, the Mayor told the
Director of the Department of Urban Renewal to use only comparable property
from the area to be cleared in computing value, and, in following this directive,
he found that he did not reach a price high enough to entice the owners to
sell. Id. at 1275. See generally Roswig, supra note 22; Vallone, The Urban
Renewal Condemnation System: Scandal and Other Related Practical Problems
of Local Government, 33 ALBANY L. Rav. 519 (1969).
27. 363 F. Supp. at 1275.
28. Id. Property was assessed at the following percentages of true cash value:
1969-20.51%; 1970-19%; 1971-18%; 1972-17.8%. "Thus the use
of the assessed value by the City in determining the value of homes could also con-
tribute to computation of a low price." Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1274. In United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943), the Supreme
Court stated that just "compensation means the full and perfect equivalent in
money of the property taken [whereby] Etihe owner is ...put in as good
position pecuniarily as he would have occupied if his property had not been
taken." Id. at 373; accord, City of Cleveland v. Carcione, 118 Ohio App. 525,
530, 190 N.E.2d 52, 55-56 (1963).
31. 363 F. Supp. at 1275. The more recent cases, especially those examining
urban renewal procedures in Detroit, have found takings under a diminution
of value theory. In In re Urban Renewal, Elmwood Park Project (City of
Detroit v. Cassese), 376 Mich. 311, 317, 136 N.W.2d 896, 900 (1965), letters
from the defendant-City that caused tenants to move out, coupled with un-
precedented and intense building inspections, were found to constitute a taking.
Cf. Conroy-Prugh Glass Co. v. Commonwealth . ....... Pa ........ 321 A.2d 598(1974). Similarly, in Foster v. City of Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Mich.
1966), aff'd, 405 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1968), condemnation proceedings lasted
ten years before the property was taken. Plaintiffs were told that they would
not be compensated for any major improvements, were ultimately forced to raze
their buildings, and were finally compensated only for the vacant lots that
19761
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Market value is often defined as the price that the property would
bring at the time of the taking if offered by a willing seller who is
not obliged to sell to a willing buyer who is not obliged to buy.32 In
Amen not only did plaintiffs sell somewhat unwillingly, but also,
with the exception of the City, there were no longer any willing
buyers. The City had effectively destroyed the private market for
property in the area by a variety of tactics: (1) repeatedly telling
residents that the area would be cleared and issuing press releases
to that effect, (2) telling willing buyers that there was no mortgage
or Federal Housing Authority insurance available, (3) informing
the Federal Housing Authority and commercial lenders that the area
would be cleared, (4) refusing to put any of the City-owned houses
back on the market, and, in one case, (5) discouraging a private
buyer and then purchasing the property itself.33 Thus plaintiffs
were obliged to sell to the sole willing purchaser, the City, which
had created an artificially depressed market value.
Other municipal policies drove residents from the area. Using its
power to issue building, repair, and occupancy permits, the City
encouraged abandonment by arbitrarily denying, or by causing un-
reasonable delays in, the issuance of such permits.3 4 Some residents
were required to sign forms stating that any repairs permitted by
the City would not be considered in computing the value of their
homes should the City later acquire them. Others were required
to perform maintenance and install items not required by the build-
remained at the time of the taking. The district court held that "the actions
of the defendant which substantially contributed to and accelerated the decline
in value of plaintiffs' property constituted a 'taking' of plaintiffs' property within
the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, for which just compensation must be
paid." 254 F. Supp. at 665-66; accord, Madison Realty Co. v. City of Detroit,
315 F. Supp. 367, 371 (E.D. Mich. 1970) (the court found a taking because
of the denial of building permits, refusal to reassess property values for tax
purposes, continued publication of renewal plans for the area, and denial of some
city services); see Comment, A Redefinition of just Compensation for Takings in
Urban Redevelopment, supra note 9, at 87-92.
32. D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW
331-32 (1971). "Justice can usually be achieved by valuing the property as it
was immediately before the first official step of the project . . . ." Id. at 336;
accord, City of Cleveland v. Carcione, 118 Ohio App. 525, 533, 190 N.E.2d
52, 57 (1963).
33. 363 F. Supp. at 1273.
34. Id. at 1272. See also Madison Realty Co. v. City of Detroit, 315 F.
Supp. 367, 371 (E.D. Mich. 1970); Foster v. City of Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655,
662 (E.D. Mich. 1966).
[Vol. 9:317
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ing code. Property owned by the City was often left in disrepair.
The City contributed to pollution in the area by selling some of
its property to a brick manufacturer and an asphalt processor.36 In
addition, the City posted signs throughout the neighborhoods overtly
soliciting sales37 and inviting vandalism of vacant and unprotected
City-owned property.38
In short, the City's activities added to the depreciation and de-
valuation of all properties in the project area.3 Such tactics led
the court to require that the City submit to any valid claims by
individuals alleging a difference between the City's purchasing price
and the fair market value of the property acquired. 40
The injunctive relief granted, which prevented the City from
acquiring other properties and from rezoning in the area for five
years, brought the clearance project to a halt. If the City had not
been enjoined from furthering its clearance of the area, it could
then have proceeded to condemn the remaining properties using
the power of eminent domain. The City would have had to show, how-
ever, a valid public purpose in order to proceed.41 Here the balancing
35. 363 F. Supp. at 1272. See also Foster v. City of Detroit, 254 F. Supp.
655, 662 (E.D. Mich. 1966).
36. 363 F. Supp. at 1273.
37. Id. Examples included: "Whoever wishes to sell to the City of Dearborn,
call City Attorney," "Sold to the City of Dearborn," and "Cash for your house.
The City will pay a good fair price for any house in this block. See City
Attorney, City Hall." Id. at 1273-74.
38. Id. at 1273. For example: "Free at your risk, take any part of the house.
First come, first served. Hurry." These signs precipitated vandalism and the
stripping of houses much to the consternation of the remaining property owners.
39. See In re Urban Renewal, Elmwood Park Project (City of Detroit v.
Cassese), 376 Mich. 311, 318, 136 N.W.2d 896, 900 (1965) ("If an area has
been made a wasteland by the condemning authority, the property owner should
not be obliged to suffer the reduced value of his property."); 4 NCHOLS, supra
note 5, at § 12.3151[51. See also In re Appropriation for Highway Purposes,
18 Ohio App. 2d 116, 247 N.E.2d 315 (1969): "The proper time for valuing
the property is before the value 'has depreciated due to the activity of the
appropriating authority' or authorities 'in acquiring other properties in the
immediate vicinity and demolishing buildings thereon, causing deterioration of
the neighborhood and depreciation of the remaining properties.'" Id. at 119,
247 N.E.2d at 318, citing Bekos v. Masheter, 15 Ohio St. 2d 15, 20, 238 N.E.2d
548, 552 (1968). But cf. Woodland Market Realty Co. v. City of Cleveland,
426 F.2d 955, 958 (6th Cir. 1970).
40. 363 F. Supp. at 1283-84. The City was also ordered to maintain its
vacant lots properly and to destroy any vacant structures. Id.
41. See cases cited notes 45-47 infra.
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of interests theory becomes applicable in determining whether a
taking has occurred. The test under this theory is "whether the
claimant's loss is or is not outweighed by the public's concomitant
gain."42 Balancing the two interests, the Amen court found that
plaintiffs' monetary losses and eviction from the neighborhood out-
weighed the public's gain in having the City clear the area.4
Michigan statutory law permits a city to make acquisitions only
for a public purpose. 4 Although the power of the courts to review
a governmental unit's designation of a public purpose is limited,4
no case has entirely prohibited such review.46 Judicial review may
question whether or not the designation of a public purpose has
been made in bad faith.4 7 In Amen the City failed to provide any
documentation of a public purpose for clearing these areas other
than mere indications in the enabling ordinances that they were
to be cleared for commercial and industrial use.48  Consequently,
the court found that the "acquisitions under this program are
42. Michelman, supra note 9, at 1184; see id. 1190-93; cf. United States v.
Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958); La Salle Nat'l Bank v.
County of Cook, 60 Ill. App. 2d 39, 51, 208 N.E.2d 430, 436 (1965); Rochester
Business Institute, Inc. v. City of Rochester, 25 App. Div. 2d 97, 101-02, 267
N.Y.S.2d 274, 279-80 (1966); Kratovil & Harrison, Eminent Domain-Policy and
Concept, 42 CALIF. L. RFv. 596, 626-29 (1954).
43. Plaintiffs also alleged a violation of equal protection because of the pre-
dominantly Arab population and low economic status of the neighborhood. See
Trial Brief for Defendant City at 6, Amen v. City of Dearborn, 363 F. Supp.
1267 (E.D. Mich. 1973). The court found it could infer no intent or purpose
to discriminate on the basis of race. 363 F. Supp. at 1281; see Kennedy Park
Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 1010 (1971); Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency,
395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968). Plaintiffs' allegation of discrimination on the
basis of wealth was rejected, partially on the ground that "wealth" is not a
"suspect classification." 363 F. Supp. at 1281. See San Antonio Independent
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
44. Micn. STAT. ANN. § 5.2078(2) (1949).
45. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954); Bragg v. Weaver,
251 U.S. 57, 58 (1919).
46. See United States v. Agee, 322 F.2d 139, 142 (6th Cir. 1963). See also
City of Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439, 446 (1930).
47. United States v. Agee, 322 F.2d 139, 142 (6th Cir. 1963); see D. HAOMAN,
supra note 32, at 316 ("A judicial issue arises as to questions of necessity only
when fraud, bad faith, or abuse of discretion in the determination of necessity
is involved."). See also Note, The Condemnor's Liability for Damages Arising
Through Instituting, Litigating, or Abandoning Eminent Domain Proceedings,
1967 UTAH L. Rav. 548, 552.
48. 363 F. Supp. at 1278-79.
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illegal in that no public purpose has ever been established ...
Industrial and commercial use by itself does not constitute a public
purpose."9
The court, viewing the City's tactics with obvious disfavor, found
extensive injunctive relief necessary. The City was enjoined from
(1) acquiring any property in the project areas except by con-
demnation of substandard structures, 0 (2) refusing building, re-
pair, or occupancy permits, (3) requiring owners to agree that the
City need not compensate for improvements, (4) interfering, with
the granting of mortgage money, (5) posting any signs soliciting
sales or inviting vandalism, (6) publicizing clearance plans, and
(7) rezoning the area for five years.51
Perhaps the most novel aspect of the decision is the complex set
of facts that led to an implicit finding of a "scheme." The court
prefaced its holding with the suggestion that none of the City's ac-
tivities standing alone would constitute a taking.52 The finding of
a taking seemed to be a direct consequence of the absence of formal
plans to condemn the properties in question.5 3 Apparently the City
viewed its informal procedures to be the most profitable course to
take. Formal condemnation requires hearings on the amount of
compensation the condemnees are to receive.54 Doubtless the City
would then have had to pay a higher price for each parcel acquired.
The other available course would have been to rezone the area
for commercial and industrial uses. A rezoning, however, would
not, in and of itself, have cleared the area.55 In addition, rezoning
would have eliminated the possibility of a middleman profit for
49. Id. at 1279.
50. Id. at 1283. Note that in this situation the nuisance abatement theory
justifies the condemnation. See note 11 supra.
51. 363 F. Supp. at 1283-84.
52. Id. at 1277; see note 3 supra.
53. If the City's plans had included formal condemnation, the remedy avail-
able to plaintiffs would not necessarily have been under a de facto taking theory
but more likely would have been an adjustment of the condemnation award for
"precondemnation blight." See note 19 supra.
54. See note 22 supra.
55. A pre-existing, non-conforming use cannot be removed from an area by
a zoning change unless the use constitutes a nuisance. See, e.g., 8 A. McQUILLIN,
MuNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 25.180-.183 (3d ed. 1965). If the City had re-
zoned the area, industry could only have bought the property it needed on a
lot-by-lot basis as the owners became willing to sell.
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the City when reselling the acquired property to industry at a higher
price.
Amen indicates the potential dangers of trying to clear and rezone
an urban sector without invoking the power of eminent domain,
particularly when no valid public purpose can be demonstrated.
Amen holds that a city cannot use coercive and value-depressing
tactics to clear an area merely because it is the most profitable way
to do so.58 Residential areas cannot be removed even from a pre-
dominantly industrial sector of the city except by formal proceedings
in eminent domain. This is Amen's caveat to city planners.
Amen v. City of Dearborn significantly extends the application of
the de facto taking doctrine in at least two respects. First, it recog-
nized that governmental action resulting in a market-chilling effect
could lead to a finding of a constitutional taking.57 Secondly, as a
result, the district court gave extensive and drastic injunctive relief.
Consequently, defendant-City has appealed the district court decision
to the Sixth Circuit.59
The Sixth Circuit is unique in its application of the de facto
taking doctrine to alleged abuses by local governments. 00 In the
recent case of Sayre v. City of Cleveland68 the Sixth Circuit admitted
that in Foster v. City of Detroit1' it had recognized "that an urban
renewal authority, by abusing its power of eminent domain, may
56. See generally In re Urban Renewal, Elmwood Park Project (City of
Detroit v. Cassese), 376 Mich. 311, 136 N.W.2d 896 (1965), in which the
court commented on similar tactics by stating that "a city may not by deliberate
acts reduce the value of private property and thereby deprive the owner of
just compensation." Id. at 317, 136 N.W.2d at 900.
57. See text at notes 31-33 supra.
58. See text at notes 50-51 supra. An injunction against rezoning an area
for five years is indeed drastic relief.
59. Amen v. City of Dearborn, No. 74-1650, (6th Gir., filed ............................
1974).
60. See Foster v. Herley, 330 F.2d 87, 89 (6th Cir. 1964); Sayre v. United
States, 282 F. Supp. 175, 182-83 (N.D. Ohio 1967). See generally Sayre v.
City of Cleveland, 493 F.2d 64 (6th Cir. 1974); Woodland Market Realty Co.
v. City of Cleveland, 426 F.2d 955 (6th Cir. 1970); United States v. Agee,
322 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1963); Madison Realty Co. v. City of Detroit, 315 F.
Supp. 367 (E.D. Mich. 1.970); Foster v. City of Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655
(E.D. Mich. 1966), aff'd, 405 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1968).
61. 493 F.2d 64 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3196 (Oct. 15,
1974).
62. 405 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1968).
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cause such damage to property that it is actually 'taken' within the
meaning of the fifth and fourteenth amendments."63 On the other
hand, in Woodland Market Realty Co. v. City of Cleveland"4 the
court refused to extend its de facto taking doctrine to compensate
a landowner whose property declined in value because it was adjacent
to an urban renewal project.6 5
The court in Sayre relied on Woodland Market Realty Co. to find
that, absent an abuse of eminent domain power, economic loss caused
by urban renewal does not constitute a taking.6 6 The dispositive
facts in Sayre were that the City had neither initiated eminent domain
proceedings against plaintiff's properties, nor evidenced any intent
to begin such procedures, nor physically invaded the property.67
Diminution of value, standing alone, was held insufficient to consti-
tute a taking."8
This is not to say that Amen v. City of Dearborn will be reversed
on appeal.69 There is ample language in Sayre70 to predict that when
63. 493 F.2d at 69. The court went on to state: "In fact, our reading of
the cases indicates that this Court in Foster possibly broke new ground when
it held that abuse of condemnation authority could constitute a taking." Id.
64. 426 F.2d 955 (6th Cir. 1970).
65. Id. at 959:
Actions done in the proper exercise of governmental powers which do not
directly encroach upon private property, though they may impair its use
or value, do not amount to a taking of such property within the meaning
of the constitutional provision that private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation.
Id. at 958.
66. 493 F.2d at 69. The public policy reason underlying this holding is
obvious. If every decline in value caused by an urban renewal project was
compensable, such projects would become economically unfeasible.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Note that the question of whether actions such as those involved in Amen
constitute a taking has not been faced by the United States Supreme Court. See
Foster v. City of Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655, 664 (E.D. Mich. 1966).
70. 493 F.2d at 69-70. The supporting language is stated conversely: "Absent
the abuse of eminent domain found in Foster, including some action by the city
indicating that the particular piece of property at issue is to be appropriated,
economic loss caused by urban renewal does not constitute a taking. ... "
Id. at 69 (emphasis in original). The court also provided a concise statement
of their new and stricter de facto taking rule:
[A]bsent the extreme circumstances present in the Foster case, but lacking
here, we think the true rule is that there is no de facto taking of properties
which have decreased in value because of an urban renewal project unless
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faced with the coercive and value-depressing tactics found in Amen,
the Sixth Circuit will rely on Amen's closer similarity to the Foster
line of cases-' and affirm the finding of a de facto taking.72
Robin J. Omahana
there is a physical invasion, damage or injury, or a restraint of some type,
or action by the City to appropriate such properties.
Id. at 70; see text at note 7 supra. Since it can be easily argued that the abuse
of discretion in Amen exceeded the activities that led to the finding of a taking
in Foster, the Sixth Circuit is likely to affirm, even under the newly articulated
rule.
71. See note 6 supra.
72. Note also that since Amen involved no proposed de jure condemnation
and no finding of a valid public purpose, it is a more appropriate example of a
de facto taking case than those that might more accurately be termed condemnation
blight. See note 19'supra. See also 72 COLUM. L. REv. 772 (1972):
The concept of "de facto taking" represents an effort to respond equitably
to the actual effects of the condemnation Irocess. The theory of de facto
taking is simply stated: during the time prior to the signing of transfer
documents and the taking of possession by the government, the prospective
condemnee is in fact stripped of the incidents of ownership - saleability,
usability, leasehold value. At some point in this stripping process a taking
occurs, and compensation is then due.
Id. at 774.
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